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Ticket to an Antitrust Violation?  Why the NFL and 
DirecTV’s Exclusive Distributorship Agreement 
for Sunday Ticket May Violate Antitrust Laws, and 
How the U.S. District Court for the Central District 






Do you live outside of your hometown but still desire to watch your 
hometown’s NFL team every week?  Do you want to watch players from 
other teams for fantasy football purposes, watch your favorite team from 
another city, or simply want to watch every game available?  Unless you 
are willing to pay for an expensive annual subscription to watch NFL 
Sunday Ticket, DirecTV’s anticompetitive exclusive agreement for the live 
broadcast of out-of-market games could prohibit you from doing so.1 
The NFL is the premier provider of professional football in the United 
States, with an average of 16.5 million viewers per week during the regular 
season in 2016.2  Beginning in 1994, the NFL and DirecTV entered into an 
agreement whereby DirecTV became the exclusive provider of broadcasts 
of out-of-market NFL games via its Sunday Ticket package.3  From 1994, 
when the initial exclusive agreement was made, to 2015, each NFL team 
was independently incorporated, owned, and operated.4  This changed in 
2015 when the NFL decided to “[incorporate] as the National Football 
League, Inc., with its headquarters in New York, New York,” and 
 
   Haig Siranosian, J.D. Candidate, U.C. Hastings. I would like to thank Professor Sam Miller 
for his encouragement and assistance with this topic. 
 1. Sunday Ticket Only on DirectTV, DIRECTTV (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/ 
id/18412873/nfl-tv-viewership-drops-average-8-percent-season [perma.cc/AN5V-ZVSS]. 
 2. Darren Rovell, NFL TV Viewership Dropped an Average of 8 Percent this Season, ESPN 
(Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/18412873/nfl-tv-viewership-drops-average-8-perc 
ent-season [perma.cc/3FRZ-69C3]. 
 3. In re Nat’l Football League Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., No. ML 15-02668-BRO(JEMX) 
2017 WL 3084276, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2017). 
 4. Id. at *2. 
   
Summer 2019 TICKET TO ANTITRUST VIOLATION? 343 
simultaneously created NFL Enterprises, LLC “to hold the broadcast rights 
of the thirty-two NFL teams and to license them to various Multichannel 
Video Programming Distributors (MVPDs).”5  Today, the thirty-two NFL 
teams grant the NFL the right to negotiate pooled television rights on their 
behalf.6  The NFL contracts with five networks, CBS, FOX, NBC, ESPN, 
and NFL Network, to provide a limited number of live broadcasts every 
Sunday, Monday night, and Thursday Night.7  The only way to watch 
games that are not broadcasted on one of the five networks, (e.g. out-of-
market games), is to purchase DirecTV’s Sunday Ticket package.8 
The United States District Court for the Central District of California 
recently heard a challenge to DirecTV’s exclusive distributorship 
agreement with the NFL.9  A class of individuals and business owners who 
had purchased DirecTV’s package sued the NFL and DirecTV alleging that 
the exclusive agreement between DirecTV and the NFL was 
anticompetitive and violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.10  The Plaintiffs 
further alleged that Sunday Ticket resulted in consumers paying supra-
competitive prices for out-of-market games and that the NFL Defendants 
have entered into an illegal horizontal agreement, e.g., an agreement 
between competitors, that restricted supply.11  Additionally, they argued 
that but for the horizontal agreement between the NFL Defendants, teams 
would “create [their] own broadcasts,” and compete with each other in the 
marketplace, thereby promoting competition and reducing prices for 
consumers.12  Thus, the Plaintiffs pleaded two causes of action: 1) a 
restraint on competition in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act, and 2) monopolization of “the live video presentation of regular 
season NFL games,” in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.13  Rather than allowing proceedings to continue and potentially ending 
DirecTV’s anticompetitive monopoly, the court granted the defendants’ 
motions to dismiss both the Section 1 and Section 2 claims.14 
This Note addresses and  rebuts the court’s decision regarding two 
issues which the court answered in the negative: 1) whether the vertical 
agreement between DirecTV and the NFL Defendants and the horizontal 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at *3. 
 7. In re Nat’l Football League Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 3084276 at *3. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at *1. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at *3. 
 12. Id. 
 13. In re Nat’l Football League Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 3084276 at *4. 
 14. Id. at *18. 
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agreement among the NFL defendants were anticompetitive and violated 
Section1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act; and 2) whether the Defendants have 
created an unlawful monopoly in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.   
Parts I and II below address issues one and two presented above 
respectively.  Each part begins with a review of the relevant statutes and 
legal standards for determining whether a Sherman Antitrust Act violation 
exists.  Each sub-part then reviews in detail relevant case law and provides 
an analysis which attempts to show that the court’s judgment was incorrect, 
and that in fact an antitrust violation may exist.  This Note advances the 
following reasons for why the court may have erred in granting the motion 
to dismiss: first, in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ Section 1 claim, the court 
relied on inapposite case law to determine that the vertical agreement does 
not restrict output; relied on inapposite case law and failed to consider 
important factors in determining that the vertical agreement does not 
artificially inflate prices; relied on inapposite case law and disregarded 
relevant case law that the Plaintiffs cited in determining that the horizontal 
agreement between the NFL Defendants was not anticompetitive; 
incorrectly held that the NFL Defendants have not restrained trade within 
the relevant market; and incorrectly held that the exclusive distributorship 
here was lawful.  Second, in reliance on its determination that Plaintiffs 
failed to allege facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ 
Section 1 claim, the District Court for the Central District of California 
erroneously dismissed Plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim as well. 
 
I. THE SECTION 1 CLAIM – RESTRAINT OF TRADE  
OR COMMERCE 
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states that “[e]very contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is 
declared to be illegal,” and every person who engages in such illegal 
activity is guilty of a felony.15  Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows private 
civil actions to be brought by “any person who shall be injured in his 
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust 
laws.”16  However, not every agreement that restrains competition violates 
the Sherman Act; rather, to be unlawful, the agreement must unreasonably 
restrain competition.17  The unreasonableness of the agreement is analyzed 
 
 15. 15 U.S.C. §1 (2018). 
 16. 15 U.S.C. §15(a) (2018). 
 17. Kingray, Inc. v. NBA, Inc., 188 F.Supp. 2d 1177, 1187 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (citing McDaniel v. 
Appraisal Inst., 117 F.3d 421, 422 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
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under either a per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis.18 
Per se violations  restrict competition on their face and require no 
further analysis.19  The rule of reason analysis requires the plaintiff to 
establish (1) an agreement or conspiracy between two or more persons or 
entities; (2) through which the persons or entities intend to harm or restrain 
competition; and, (3) that actually does restrain competition.20  The history 
of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the 
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant 
facts.21  Additionally, [p]roving injury to competition ordinarily requires 
the claimant to prove the relevant geographic and product markets and to 
demonstrate the effects of the restraint within those markets.22  Since 
horizontal agreements between sports teams and vertical agreements are 
not anticompetitive on their face, the court properly applied the rule of 
reason analysis.23 
In addition to satisfying the requirements for a Section 1 claim 
outlined above, a plaintiff must adhere to the applicable pleading standards.  
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) (FRCP 8(a)) provides that a 
complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief.24  Failure to satisfy FRCP 8(a)’s 
evidentiary standard may lead to the opposing party filing a motion to 
dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6).25  Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss, 
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’26  To be plausible on its face, a 
plaintiff must “plead factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”27  However, as detailed below, after applying the rule of reason, 
the District Court for the Central District of California (“Central District of 
California”) improperly held that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient 
to survive the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 




 18. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984). 
 19. In re Nat’l Football League Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 3084276 at *6. 
 20. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Commc’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1391 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
 21. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 22. Thurman Indus. Inc. v. Pay ‘N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 23. In re Nat’l Football League Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 3084276 at *8. 
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 26. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 27. Id. 
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Vertical agreements are those which are entered in to among different 
levels of the supply chain, for example between a manufacturer and a 
distributor.  Exclusive distributorship arrangements are presumptively 
legal.28  Under the antitrust “rule of reason,” an exclusive dealing 
arrangement violates Section 1 only if its effect is to foreclose competition 
in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected.29  Therefore, 
foreclosure in excess of forty percent creates a presumption of 
anticompetitive behavior and can serve as the asserted basis for an antitrust 
violation.30  Further, the plaintiff must prove that the exclusive arrangement 
is likely to keep at least one significant competitor of the defendant from 
doing business in a relevant market.31 
The Central District of California relied on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rutman that an agreement 
between a manufacturer and a distributor to establish an exclusive 
distributorship is not, standing alone, a violation of antitrust laws.”32  
However, the Central District of California failed to further explore Rutman 
or analogize Rutman’s facts to the facts before it regarding DirecTV and 
the NFL. In Rutman, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal 
of the plaintiff wine distributor’s antitrust claims against the defendant.33  
Rutman argued that Gallo terminated its distributorship agreement as part 
of a conspiracy or combination with Wine Distributors, Inc. (WDI) to 
restrain trade.”34  The plaintiff also alleged that because it is the exclusive 
dealer of two of Gallo’s chief competitors, the injury to its own ability to 
compete in turn harms the public by substantially reducing or eliminating 
competition in the sale of wine in the relevant market.35  The Ninth Circuit 
noted that while appellant clearly pleads injury to itself, its conclusion that 
competition has been harmed thereby does not follow.36 
Gallo’s termination of its agreement with Rutman and subsequent 
agreement with WDI did not foreclose competition in a substantial share of 
 
 28. Elecs. Commc’ns Corp. v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods Inc., 129 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
 29. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group LP, 592 F.3d 991, 996 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (quoting Omega Envtl, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 30. Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,” and Consumer Harm, 70 
ANTITRUST L.J. 311 (2002). 
 31. Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 394 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 32. In re Nat’l Football League Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 3084276, at *9 (quoting 
Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 33. Rutman, 829 F.2d at 738. 
 34. Id. at 734. 
 35. Id. at 734. 
 36. Id. 
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the line of commerce.37  Rutman itself admitted that it also distributed 
wines produced by two of Gallo’s biggest competitors.38  Consequently, 
Rutman was still active in the affected market as Gallo was not the only 
wine producer in the country.   
However, the NFL’s exclusive distributorship with DirecTV does 
foreclose competition in the relevant market.  The Central District of 
California properly defined the “relevant market” here as the live broadcast 
of professional football games.39  Unlike the wine industry, the NFL faces 
no competition as it is the only professional football league in the United 
States and its teams have entered in to a horizontal agreement not to 
compete with respect to the live broadcast of games.  Sunday Ticket 
accounts for ten of the sixteen games played per week.  The remaining six 
are aired on Fox, CBS, ESPN, and NFL Network.40  Accordingly, Sunday 
Ticket makes up 62.5% of the market for live broadcasts of professional 
football games during the regular season, far greater than the generally 
accepted forty percent threshold requirement.  As a result, the exclusive 
distributorship forecloses competition in a substantial share of the relevant 
market.41 
It is true that when a manufacturer and distributor so agree to establish 
an exclusive distributorship, the termination of other distributors may 
necessarily result.42  Additionally, an exclusive distributorship agreement 
between a manufacturer and a distributor is not, standing alone, a violation 
of antitrust laws.43  However, foreclosing a substantial portion of the 
market is not Sunday Ticket’s only anticompetitive effect.  The Supreme 
Court held that a manufacturer of a product that is readily available in the 
market from other equivalent manufacturers may select his exclusive 
distributor, and if nothing more is involved and if competitive products are 
readily available to others, this restriction, is not a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act.44   
Here, several of the factors mentioned in Schwinn are not met.  First, 
the only “other and equivalent brands” available are competing teams.45  
However, the NFL teams’ horizontal agreements not to compete with each 
 
 37. Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 996 (quoting Omega Environmental, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 
127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 38. Rutman, 829 F.2d at 734. 
 39. In re NFL Antitrust Litigation, 2017 WL 3084276 at *17. 
 40. Id. at *3. 
 41. Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 996 (quoting Omega Environmental, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 
127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 42. Rutman, 829 F.2d at 735. 
 43. Id. at 735 (emphasis added). 
 44. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 338 U.S. 365, 376 (1967). 
 45. Id. at 365. 
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other for broadcasts, eliminated alternative brands from the market.  
Second, there are also no “competitive products readily available” to other 
distributors.46  Other sports, such as basketball, baseball, or soccer, are not 
competitive products.  As the Central District of California noted, multiple 
courts have recognized that a market may be limited to one professional 
sport, because professional sports attract a unique and specific audience.47  
Thus, by virtue of the NFL teams’ horizontal agreement and the 
recognition that other sports are not competitive products, there are no 
readily available competitive products. 
Proponents of the Central District of California’s decision may contest 
the argument in the preceding paragraph on the grounds that it suggests that 
sports organizations may never enter in to exclusive distributorship 
agreements.  That is not the intent of the preceding argument.  In this 
specific instance, there are additional factors that make the agreement 
between DirecTV and the NFL illegal as it is not “an exclusive 
distributorship . . . standing alone.”48  Courts will consider the length of an 
exclusive distributorship when determining if the agreement is 
anticompetitive.49  One factor is contractual length, as Exclusive dealing 
contracts are lawful if limited to  one year.50  For example, General Motors, 
Ford, and Chrysler invite tire manufacturers to bid for exclusive rights to 
have their tires used in the manufacturer’s cars.51  Further, the longer the 
exclusive agreement is, the more anticompetitive it tends to be.  As 
opposed to the agreements in Motion Pictures and those between auto 
manufacturers and tire manufacturers, DirecTV’s contract for Sunday 
Ticket spans eight years.52  By the time the current deal expires in 2022, 
DirecTV will have been the exclusive distributor of Sunday Ticket for 
twenty-eight consecutive years.53 
In addition to the length of the agreement, the exclusive 
distributorship also eliminates interbrand and intrabrand competition.  The 
effect on intrabrand competition is not relevant if there is intense interbrand 
competition, and the barriers to entry into the market are low.54  Here, there 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. In re Nat’l Football League Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 3084276, at *17. 
 48. Rutman, 829 F.2d at 735. 
 49. Paddock Publ’ns v. Chi. Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 47 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 50. Id.; see FTC v. Motion Pictures Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395−96 (1953). 
 51. Paddock,103 F.3d at 45. 
 52.Darren Rovell, NFL, DirecTV extend deal for 8 years, ESPN (Oct. 1, 2014), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/11624442/nfl-extends-sunday-ticket-deal-directv [perma.cc/SYC7-
88H6]. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Murphy v. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation 
omitted). 
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is no intense interbrand competition for two reasons: first, the NFL is the 
only professional football league in the relevant market, and second, 
interbrand competition between the teams was eliminated when they agreed 
not to compete against each other for broadcasts out of their respective 
markets.  Consequently, the effect on intrabrand competition is relevant.  
The combination of foreclosure of competition to a substantial portion of 
the relevant market, the lack of interbrand competition, and the duration of 
the contract has a negative effect on intrabrand competition between 
potential distributors because there is little or no opportunity for them to 
compete in the relevant market.  Further, the barriers to entry into the 
relevant market here are high.  Several attempts to compete with the NFL 
have been made in the past, and almost all have failed.55  Arguably, the 
only remaining competitor to the NFL is the Arena Football League, which 
produces an altogether different product. 
The aforementioned arguments show that the exclusive arrangement is 
likely to keep at least one significant competitor of the defendant from 
doing business in the market.56  None of DirecTV’s competitors such as 
Xfinity, Comcast, Spectrum, Dish Network, or others compete for the live 
broadcast of professional football games due to the foreclosure of 
competition, the length of the agreement, and the lack of alternative brands.  
At the very least, sufficient facts exist to survive a motion to dismiss 
regarding a claim of an anticompetitive exclusive distributorship between 
the NFL Defendants and DirecTV. 
 
B. THE VERTICAL AGREEMENT–DEFINITION AND RESTRICTION OF OUTPUT 
 
The Central District of California improperly relied on Board of 
Regents of University of Oklahoma to define “output.”57  In rejecting the 
Plaintiffs’ definition of output as “the number of broadcasts of Sunday 
afternoon NFL games,” the Central District of California found the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma 
instructive.58  There, the NCAA implemented a television broadcasting plan 
in order to protect attendance of NCAA football games, and licensed the 
right to broadcast games to ABC and CBS.59  The plan limited the total 
number of games that were broadcast and limited the number of games that 
 
 55. ESPN Research, Other football leagues of the past, ESPN (Dec. 12, 2008), http://www. 
espn.com/extra/afl/news/story?id=3764806 [perma.cc/3ZBX-JH7R]. 
 56. Roland Machinery Co., 749 F.2d at 394. 
 57. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 58. In re Nat’l Football League Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 3084276 at *10. 
 59. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 91−94 (1984)). 
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any team could appear in in a season.60  In response, the College Football 
Association (CFA) entered in to its own agreement with NBC to televise 
additional games and increase revenues for the schools it sought to 
protect.61  The NCAA counteracted the CFA’s agreement by threatening to 
sanction any team that joined the CFA-NBC agreement.62  The Supreme 
Court held that the NCAA’s agreement was anticompetitive because it 
prevented games from being broadcast at all, and therefore decreased 
output.63 
While the definition of output and whether it was restricted in Board 
of Regents of University of Oklahoma was correct in the context of that 
case, there are important factors that, when considered together, distinguish 
the agreement between DirecTV and the NFL.  As with the NFL in the 
current agreement, in Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma (Board 
of Regents) the NCAA licensed the right to broadcast games to multiple 
networks.64  However, unlike the agreement for Sunday Ticket, the 
networks were not required to provide their broadcasts to a single provider 
due to a vertical agreement between the NCAA and a cable or satellite TV 
provider, such as DirecTV.  Thus, there was competition between networks 
for the right to broadcast games, competition between providers to enter in 
to agreements with networks for the broadcasts, and competition between 
providers for subscribers.  The restriction on output was the fact that the 
NCAA limited the number of games that could be broadcast.65  In the 
current scenario with Sunday Ticket, there is competition between 
networks for broadcasting rights, but beyond that competition is eliminated 
by the vertical agreement.  It is true that there is competition when the 
contract between the NFL and DirecTV is up for renewal, but as noted 
above in Part I(A), several factors make this exclusive distributorship 
illegal and DirecTV has been the provider for the last twenty-four years.  
Therefore, the only way to watch out-of-market NFL games is to subscribe 
to DirecTV’s Sunday Ticket package.  Instead of allowing anyone to 
purchase the package regardless of their cable or satellite provider as the 
NCAA did, users must subscribe to DirecTV. 
Nonetheless, the Central District of California held that the agreement 
between the NFL and DirecTV does not restrict output because it does not 
limit the number of games that can be broadcast.66  Concededly, it is a 
 
 60. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 106−07 (1984)). 
 61. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 94−95 (1984)). 
 62. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 94−95 (1984)). 
 63. Bd. of Regents of Okla., 468 U.S. at 106−07. 
 64. Id. at 92. 
 65. Bd. of Regents of Okla., 468 U.S. at 105−07. 
66.    In re Nat'l Football League Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 3084276, at *11. 
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stretch to say that DirecTV is the only provider independently restricting 
output.  As the Central District of California correctly noted, prior to 1994, 
when the NFL and DirecTV entered in to their first agreement to provide 
Sunday Ticket, out-of-market games were generally unavailable on TV.67  
Additionally, in theory, a single broadcast could reach more viewers than 
multiple broadcasts. 
However, that is not the case here.  In Board of Regents, the Supreme 
Court held one of the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s policy was 
that output was lower than it would otherwise be.68  Thus, in its rationale 
for no anticompetitive behavior Central District of California focused that 
prior to Sunday Ticket’s initial broadcast in 1994, viewers only had access 
to no more than three NFL Sunday afternoon games broadcast in any given 
market, but through Sunday Ticket, viewers can access as many as thirteen 
games.69  But this reasoning ignores  that the agreement between the NFL 
and DirecTV still restricts output today, and not relative to what the output 
was prior to the 1994 agreement.   
DirecTV was founded in 1990,70 just four years before their initial 
agreement with the NFL.  Satellite television was still new and innovative 
at that time, and therefore there was less competition.  Fast-forward twenty-
three years and the landscape is very different: DirecTV, Dish Network, 
Comcast, Spectrum, Xfinity, AT&T U-Verse, Verizon FiOS and others 
constantly compete for subscribers.  In addition, there are a variety of 
online streaming services offering live television broadcasts.   
As opposed to 1994, a multitude of providers can broadcast out-of-
market NFL games if the exclusive distributorship were broken.  Making 
Sunday Ticket nonexclusive would grant millions of additional viewers the 
opportunity to watch out-of-market games and would promote inter-
provider competition.  For example, an average of 16.5 million viewers 
watched regular season NFL games every week in 2016.71  Yet only about 
two million of those viewers were able to watch out-of-market games via 
Sunday Ticket.72  Assuming those figures are accurate, about 14.5 million 
people who watched the NFL every week could only watch nationally 
broadcast games.  Even if only fifty percent of those people would also 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Bd. of Regents of Okla., 468 U.S. at 107. 
 69. In re Nat’l Football League Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 3084276 at *11. 
 70. The Evolution of DIRECTV into The Best Satellite TV Provider, http://www.att-servi 
ces.net/directv/directv-history.html [perma.cc/Y6LY-HCDZ]. 
 71. Rovell, supra note 2. 
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subscribe to Sunday Ticket, but for the super competitive prices charged by 
DirecTV due to its exclusive distributorship agreement, around 7.25 
million viewers more per week for out-of-market games.  Therefore, in 
practice, the DirecTV and the NFL agreement does restrict output. 
The Central District of California also relied on Kingray, Inc. v. 
National Basketball Association, Inc., where the court found that the 
plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to show that “NBA League Pass” 
restricted output.73  In Kingray, a class of plaintiffs sued the National 
Basketball Association (NBA) and DirecTV alleging that their NBA 
League Pass package violated antitrust laws.74  NBA League Pass is the 
NBA’s equivalent of Sunday Ticket and is the exclusive means to license 
out-of-market games  for satellite viewing.75  In August of 1999, DirecTV 
became the exclusive distributor of the package.76  Then, in 2000, the NBA 
contracted with iNDemand to provide the NBA League Pass to residential 
cable subscribers on a pay-per-view basis.77  The court held that because 
prior to 1994-95, when NBA League Pass was first offered, out-of-market 
games were completely unavailable, NBA League Pass increased rather 
than decreased output.78  From this factual similarity, Kingray is arguably 
on point to the In re NFL Antitrust Litigation. 
However, there is a crucial distinguishing fact between the Plaintiffs’ 
case against the NFL and DirecTV from Kingray.  When Kingray was 
decided, NBA League Pass was available on a non-exclusive basis through 
both DirecTV and iN Demand.79  iN Demand, in turn, is available on a pay-
per-view basis through Comcast, Charter, Cox, Cable One, FiOS, and 
several other digital cable providers.80  Today, in addition to DirecTV and 
iN Demand, NBA League Pass is also available through Frontier 
Communications, Dish Network, and AT&T U-verse.81  Even though each 
NBA team allowed the NBA to negotiate broadcasting rights on their 
behalf just as the NFL teams have done, there is still competition between 
 
 73. Kingray, Inc. v. NBA, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1196 (S.D. Cal. 2002). 
 74. Id. at 1183. 
 75. Id. at 1184. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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providers for the contract with the NBA, and a second level of competition 
between providers for subscribers.82  Pertinent to the issue of output, the 
non-exclusive nature of NBA League Pass lessens the likelihood of a 
situation similar to the one NFL fans face, where restricted output leads to 
only two million viewers watching out-of-market games via Sunday 
Ticket,83 when an average of 16.5 million viewers per week watch NFL 
games during the regular season.84  The nonexclusivity of NBA League 
Pass means anyone who subscribes to any of the cable or satellite providers 
previously mentioned, which account for nearly the entire pay TV market,85 
has access to the package.  Making Sunday Ticket nonexclusive would 
afford NFL fans the same opportunity.  Had In re NFL Antitrust Litigation 
proceeded to discovery, it may have revealed that a portion of those 16.5 
million viewers would subscribe to Sunday Ticket if they were not forced 
to switch cable providers and pay super competitive prices, thereby 
increasing overall output. 
 
C. THE VERTICAL AGREEMENT–ARTIFICIALLY INFLATED PRICES WHICH HARM 
COMPETITION 
 
Individuals who desire to watch out-of-market live broadcasts of 
football games must pay $359 for a full season of Sunday Ticket MAX.86  
A regular full-season package cost $269.94.87  In 2015, commercial 
subscribers paid between $1,458 to more than $120,000 per season.88  
These prices are artificially inflated and harm competition. 
Mere allegations that an agreement reduces consumers’ choices or 
increased prices does not sufficiently allege an injury to competition.  Both 
effects are fully consistent with a free and competitive market.89  
Additionally, the fact that DirecTV could be charging inflated prices for 
Sunday Ticket does not, on its own, constitute harm to competition.90  
Relying on these two statements, the Central District of California quickly 
addressed and disregarded the Plaintiffs’ claim that the vertical agreement 
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 86. In re Nat’l Football League Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 3084276 at *3. 
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artificially inflates prices.91 
The Central District of California’s reliance on Brantley is misguided.  
In Brantley, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant programmers’ motion 
to dismiss a Section 1 antitrust claim brought by Plaintiffs, a class of retail 
cable subscribers’.92  Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants used their market 
power to force distributors to buy undesired channels as a condition to 
buying “must have” channels.93  As a result, there was reduced choice and 
increased price that injured competition.94  The Ninth Circuit held that 
reduction in choice or increase in price does not equate to injury to 
competition because both of those results are consistent with a free 
market.95  In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit stated Plaintiffs 
failed to allege the contracts between Programmers and Distributors forced 
either Distributors or consumers to forego the purchase of other low-
demand channels, and only asserted consumers could not purchase 
programs a la carte.”96 
Brantley is inapposite for two reasons.  First, similar to the argument 
against the Central District of California’s reliance on Board of Regents of 
Oklahoma and Kingray, in Brantley there were multiple distributors 
competing for each programmer’s bundle of channels.  If one distributor 
chose to raise prices to supra-competitive levels, consumers had several 
other distributors to turn to for what the consumer considered was a fair 
price.  The Central District of California also overlooked an important 
fact—the agreements in Brantley were not exclusive distributorships.  
Neither NBC nor any of the other programmer defendants, entered into 
exclusive agreements with distributors.  Each programmer could contract 
with multiple distributors.  Due to DirecTV’s anticompetitive exclusive 
distributorship agreement with the NFL, DirecTV is the only distributor of 
“Sunday Ticket.”  Consumers can only choose between subscribing to 
DirecTV and paying the supra-competitive price, or not having access to 
out-of-market live broadcasts of games.  Due to the NFL’s popularity, 
DirecTV can exploit its position as the exclusive distributor.  Absent the 
factors described in section I(A) above, this would be a legal exercise of 
their monopoly position.  However, due to the foreclosure to competition, 
the restriction on output, the lack of alternative brands, and the elimination 
of interbrand and intrabrand competition, there is harm to competition and 
DirecTV’s artificially inflated prices harm the plaintiffs as a result. 
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Second, the Ninth Circuit noted that Plaintiffs did not have to forego 
the purchase of other low-demand channels, as a result of the contracts 
between the programmers and distributors, so there was no injury to 
competition.97  The plaintiffs in Brantley, then, could purchase channels 
from various distributors if they wanted to.  The plaintiffs in In re NFL 
Antitrust Litigation did not have the same luxury as the plaintiffs in 
Brantley.  Because of the anticompetitive exclusive distributorship and the 
NFL defendants’ horizontal agreement not to compete, consumers only 
have one source for out-of-market broadcasts.  Thus, instead of having 
other options, such as only certain teams’ games or alternate distributors, as 
they would in a competitive environment, Plaintiffs are forced to pay 
supra-competitive prices for “Sunday Ticket.” 
Aside from Brantley being inapposite, additional facts also support the 
theory that DirecTV has artificially inflated prices and harmed competition.  
For example, compared to the $269.94 and $359 charged per year in the 
United States for a regular-season or MAX package for individuals 
respectively, individual subscribers in Canada only have to pay $15.66 
USD per month, or about $188 per year, to stream Sunday Ticket through 
DAZN.98  The monthly price for streaming via DAZN also includes access 
to other sports and European soccer matches.99  Prior to the shift to online 
streaming for the 2017-2018 season,100 customers in Canada paid 
approximately $27 USD per month for access to Sunday Ticket plus access 
to all live games of other major sports leagues.101  Due to public 
dissatisfaction with DAZN’s service, DAZN has deals with Canadian cable 
and satellite providers to redistribute Sunday Ticket .102  Whether Sunday 
Ticket is purchased on a nonexclusive basis via DAZN or a cable or 
satellite provider, Canadian customers pay less for both Sunday Ticket and 
other live games combined than customers in the U.S. pay for the former. 
Moreover, in 2002, the NFL declined iNDemand’s offer of $400 to 
$500 million per season for the non-exclusive right to Sunday Ticket.103  In 
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comparison, the NFL and DirecTV’s last exclusive distributorship 
agreement signed in 2014 is worth $1.5 billion per season.104  The NFL 
tripled its contract price solely by refusing to make Sunday Ticket 
nonexclusive; there is no added benefit to consumers for the inflated prices 
they continue to have to pay.  Maintaining the exclusive nature of Sunday 
Ticket also allowed DirecTV to maintain its supracompetitive prices.  This 
evidence, combined with the distinctions from Brantley, shows but for 
DirecTV’s anticompetitive exclusive distributorship, customers in the 
United States would not be paying artificially inflated prices for Sunday 
Ticket. 
 
D. THE HORIZONTAL AGREEMENT 
 
As noted above, a horizontal agreement is an agreement between 
competitors that restricts supply.  The Central District of California held 
Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the horizontal agreement between 
the NFL defendants because they were indirect purchasers under Illinois 
Brick.105  Nonetheless, the court analyzed the horizontal agreement claim 
and determined that it did not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act because the collective agreement between the teams involves 
intellectual property owned by more than one entity that requires the NFL 
defendants to cooperate to sell their rights.106  Although it is not controlling 
precedent for the Central District of California, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York’s holding in Laumann is 
persuasive and shows that indirect purchasers may not always be barred by 
the Illinois Brick rule.107 
Illinois Brick established that a plaintiff must be a direct purchaser to 
have standing to sue for damages in a civil antitrust action.108  In Laumann, 
the court held that the plaintiffs who had purchased out-of-market packages 
were not barred by the specific Illinois Brick rule, and had standing.109  
There, the plaintiffs brought a class action suit against the NHL, MLB, and 
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their teams, alleging, as the Plaintiffs did in In re NFL Antitrust Litigation, 
that each team entered in to an illegal horizontal agreement not to compete 
for out-of-market broadcasts and allowed their respective leagues to control 
their broadcasting rights.110  As with the networks in In re NFL Antitrust 
Litigation, Regional Sports Networks (RSNs) produced games and sold 
them to Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (MVPDs) such as 
Comcast and DirecTV, who in turn distributed them to customers.111  
Similar to DirecTV’s practice with Sunday Ticket, the MVPDs would 
black out the home team’s game in the RSNs territory and only provide 
out-of-market broadcasts.112  The out-of-market games were only available 
through NHL Center Ice and MLB Extra Innings, which are the NHL and 
MLB’s equivalent to Sunday Ticket.113  The plaintiffs alleged that the 
agreements between each leagues’ teams and between the RSNs and 
MVPDs harmed competition by reducing output and increasing prices.114  
The defendants argued, among other things, that the case should be 
dismissed because plaintiffs lacked standing as “indirect purchasers.”115  
The District Court for the Southern District of New York disagreed and 
held that where intermediate purchasers in the chain of distribution (here 
RSNs and MVPDs) are alleged to be participants in the conspiracy, the first 
purchasers who are not part of the conspiracy have standing.116  In such a 
situation, the Illinois Brick bar does not apply.117 
Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s holding in In re ATM Fee Antitrust 
Litigation, the Central District of California held the Plaintiffs lacked 
standing to sue the NFL Defendants for their horizontal agreements.118  In 
In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation, the Ninth Circuit has limited the 
boundaries of the co-conspirator exception to apply only when the 
conspiracy involves setting the price paid by plaintiffs.119  Since the 
Plaintiffs did not allege that the NFL Defendants and DirecTV conspired to 
set a price for DirecTV the co-conspirator exception as defined in In re 
ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation did not apply.120 
While In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation is binding precedent in the 
Ninth Circuit where the Central District of California sits, the Ninth Circuit 
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could expand the scenarios in which plaintiffs are not barred by Illinois 
Brick without overruling In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation.  The purpose 
of Illinois Brick was not to prevent the only non-conspirators in a multi-
level distribution chain—consumers no less—from bringing a private 
antitrust suit.121  Holding that the first purchaser who is not party to the 
unlawful agreements to restrain trade has standing to sue is not an 
exception to Illinois Brick, but rather recognition that Illinois Brick bans 
Clayton Act lawsuits by persons who are not direct purchasers from the 
defendant antitrust violators.122  Thus, to bar the Plaintiffs in In re NFL 
Antitrust Litigation from bringing suit solely because they did not allege 
price fixing of the retail price runs counter to Illinois Brick’s purpose of 
Illinois Brick.  The absence of retail price fixing does not preclude 
plaintiffs from being the first party harmed due to an unlawful agreement to 
restrain trade.  For example, while there was not explicit retail price fixing 
in In re NFL Antitrust Litigation, the Plaintiffs are still the first parties who 
are not part of the agreement to suffer from restricted output and artificially 
inflated prices caused by the unlawful exclusive distributorship between the 
NFL and DirecTV.  Even though inflated prices are not necessarily fixed 
prices, the NFL’s rejection of iNDemand’s offer to carry Sunday Ticket on 
a nonexclusive basis in favor of the much more lucrative deal to keep 
DirecTV’s unlawful exclusive distributorship in place has a similar effect.  
By accepting the exclusive deal for $1.5 billion per year, the cost to 
DirecTV is higher.  In turn, DirecTV can continue to charge supra-
competitive inflated prices.  Thus, though the price was not fixed at a 
specific rate, the parties’ intent to the agreement may have been to sustain 
the artificially high prices to unlawfully benefit themselves at consumers’ 
expense.  Allowing plaintiffs to sue for this type of harm is consistent with 
the purpose of Illinois Brick. 
Further, the Central District of California’s reliance on Washington v. 
NFL and Spinelli v. NFL is misguided.  In Washington, former NFL players 
sued the NFL, alleging an antitrust violation because the NFL refused to 
grant them rights to their historical game footage.123  The plaintiffs in 
Washington relied on American Needle, where the Supreme Court found a 
Section 1 violation surrounding the entity created by all of the NFL’s teams 
to make decisions around the teams’ separately owned intellectual 
property.124  The Washington distinguished American Needle because “the 
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intellectual property involved in Washington was historical football game 
footage, something that individual teams do not separately own, and never 
have separately owned.”125  Accordingly, Washington held while the NFL 
and its teams may potentially violate the Sherman Act when they conspire 
to market a team’s individually owned property, they do not violate the 
Sherman Act when they market collectively owned property between the 
NFL and the teams.126   
Similarly, the Central District of California pointed out in Spinelli, 
because “NFL photographs, because they  necessarily contain multiple 
entities’ intellectual property, constitute ‘collectively owned’ property 
under Washington,” and even though the entities were required to act 
collectively to produce and sell the images, their conduct did not 
contravene the Sherman Act.127  Based on Washington and Spinelli, the 
Central District of California held that “the games [which are broadcast] 
necessarily involve intellectual property rights owned by multiple entities, 
including the NFL [Defendants] . . .  As the Washington court explained, 
and the Spinelli court echoed, the multiple entities must act collectively to 
broadcast the games in order for the games to be broadcast at all.”128   
However, the Central District of California’s reliance on Washington 
and Spinelli is misguided.  For instance, in Washington, the historic footage 
was something never individually held by the teams.129  As opposed to the 
intellectual property at issue in Washington, the live broadcasts of NFL 
games contain intellectual property that the Central District of California 
itself said that NFL teams owned predating the NFL Enterprises, LLC, 
which was organized to hold the broadcast rights of the thirty-two NFL 
teams in 2015.130  The fact that each team controlled its own intellectual 
property prior to 2015 undermines the Central District of California’s 
reliance on Spinelli’s rationale requiring all the teams act together based on 
the premise that the NFL owns all of the team’s intellectual property 
rights.131  The teams separately acted prior to 2015, and only act together 
now because of their horizontal agreement not to compete for the broadcast 
of out-of-market games and the establishment of NFL Enterprises, LLC in 
2015.  The Central District of California also emphasized the difference 
between the NFL and other professional leagues such as the MLB or NHL, 
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as  the NFL must be involved in the sale of every game’s broadcast rights; 
without an agreement between the NFL and its teams, there would be no 
way to broadcast the game footage.132  Yet the NFL teams could cooperate 
without agreeing not to compete and thereby facilitating the unlawful 
exclusive distributorship between the NFL and DirecTV.  Both the MLB 
and NHL, like the NFL, require two teams to compete against each other to 
have a product to sell.  But rather than entering in to the type of 
anticompetitive horizontal agreement that the NFL teams have entered in 
to, the teams in the MLB and NHL have mutually agreed to permit the 
visiting team to produce a separate telecast of the games.133  The only 
reason that the NFL must be involved is because it incorporated and set up 
NFL Enterprises, LLC for the purpose of controlling the teams’ 
broadcasting rights, potentially to attempt to get around the holding of 
American Needle, Inc. v. NFL. 
In American Needle, the Supreme Court concluded that the activities 
of the NFL’s teams “and a corporate entity that they formed to manage 
their intellectual property . . . constitute[d] concerted action that is not 
categorically beyond the coverage of Section 1.”134  The Court held that 
“concerted action under Section 1 does not turn simply on whether the 
parties involved are legally distinct entities.  Instead, the Court  gotten rid 
of such formal distinctions in favor of a functional consideration of how the 
parties involved in the alleged anticompetitive conduct actually operate.”135  
American Needle, Inc. was one of National Football League Properties’ 
(NFLP) licensees and was permitted to manufacture and sell apparel 
bearing team insignias.136  In 2000, the teams acting through NFLP, granted 
Reebok the exclusive rights to manufacture apparel for all 32 teams and 
subsequently did not renew American Needle’s nonexclusive license.”137  
American Needle sued alleging that the agreements between the NFL, its 
teams, NFLP, and Reebok violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act.”138  The issue before the Court was whether the NFL respondents were 
capable of engaging in a “contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy” as 
defined by Section1orwhether the alleged activity by the NFL respondents 
must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of Section 1.139  
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The Court found numerous instances where members of a  facially legal 
single entity violated Section 1 when the entity was controlled by a group 
of competitors and served, in essence, as a vehicle of ongoing concerted 
activity.140  Therefore, the relevant inquiry is if there is a contract, 
combination, or conspiracy amongst separate economic actors pursuing 
separate economic interests, such that the agreement deprives the 
marketplace of the independent centers of decision making.141  The Court 
found  although acting under the guise of NFLP, the teams compete in 
intellectual property market and each team has its own economic 
interests.142  Therefore, the agreement between the NFL teams and NFLP 
deprived the marketplace of independent centers of decision making.143 
The Central District of California never compared In re NFL Antitrust 
Litigation to American Needle.  Rather, it relied on Washington and only 
quoted American Needle in a parenthetical for the proposition that the fact 
that NFL teams share an interest in making the entire league successful and 
profitable, and that they must cooperate in the production and scheduling of 
games, provides a logical rationale for making collective decisions.144  
However, there are several similarities between In re NFL Antitrust 
Litigation and American Needle.  For example, both cases involve the 
licensing of each team’s intellectual property; in both cases the teams 
agreed not to compete against one-another in the respective area, (i.e., 
apparel and television broadcasts); and in both cases a separate entity was 
used to license the intellectual property exclusively.   
There are several distinguishing factors as well: 1) American Needle 
was decided prior to 2015 when the NFL incorporated and established NFL 
Enterprises, LLC; 2) American Needle itself held that the NFL’s inherently 
cooperative nature justifies collective decision making,”145; and 3) the 
teams split the revenues from the NFL’s television contracts,146 so they are 
working toward a unified goal and are acting as a single entity through 
NFL Enterprises, LLC. 
Each of these distinguishing factors can be reconciled with the facts of 
In re NFL Antitrust Litigation.  First, American Needle held the Courts 
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should eschew formalistic distinctions in favor of a functional 
consideration of how the parties involved in the alleged anticompetitive 
conduct actually operate.147  Further, Section 1 may be violated where an 
entity is controlled by a group of competitors and serve[s], in essence, as a 
vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.148 
Thus, it is not dispositive that in 2015 the NFL incorporated and 
organized NFL Enterprises, LLC. to control teams broadcasting rights.  
Even though the teams may be considered one legal entity under the 
umbrella of NFL, Inc., each team is still independently owned and 
operated, and each still competes with others for wins, for fans, for apparel 
and ticket sales, and for revenues.  Further, without the teams acting as 
competitors, NFL Enterprises, LLC. would serve little to no purpose as 
there would be no individual intellectual property to consolidate and 
manage.   
Consequently, NFL Enterprises, LLC is controlled by a group of 
competitors and serve[s], in essence, as a vehicle for ongoing concerted 
activity.149  In addition, the teams are separate economic actors pursuing 
separate economic interests, such that the agreement “deprives the 
marketplace of the independent centers of decision making.”150  If not for 
the horizontal agreement not to compete, each team would compete with 
each other for viewers within each other’s localities.  Due to the horizontal 
agreement, each team has relinquished its decision making power to NFL, 
Enterprises, LLC, hence “‘depriving the marketplace of the independent 
centers of decision making.’”151  Ironically, the NFL’s decision to 
incorporate and organize NFL Enterprises, LLP to establish a more formal 
single entity came after the Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle.  
This may have been a reaction to the holding rather than a coincidence, 
perhaps because the NFL noticed that the exclusive distributorship with 
DirecTV, like the one between NFLP and Reebok, could fall under 
American Needle’s holding and be considered anticompetitive.  Therefore, 
American Needle is analogous to In re NFL Antitrust Litigation even 
though American Needle was decided prior to 2015 when NFL, Inc. and 
NFL Enterprises, LLC were established. 
Second, “[t]he fact that NFL teams . . . must cooperate in the 
production and scheduling of games[] provides a perfectly sensible 
justification for making a host of collective decisions,” does not mean that 
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the Supreme Court condones the type of horizontal agreement that is at 
issue between the NFL’s teams, especially when it is combined with an 
unlawful exclusive distributorship.152  Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has 
held that “agreements limiting the telecasting of professional sports games 
are subject to antitrust scrutiny, and analyzed under the rule of reason.”153  
Further, “a horizontal agreement that allocates a market between 
competitors and restricts each [team’s] ability to compete for the other’s 
business may injure competition.”154  Therefore, consumers are not 
prohibited from bringing suit because the “production and scheduling of 
games[] provides perfectly sensible justification for making a host of 
collective decisions.”155 
Assuming that plaintiffs, such as those in In re NFL Antitrust 
Litigation, are not barred by Illinois Brick, Laumann does not  
“conflict[] . . . with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in In re ATM Fee Antitrust 
Litigation,” and is persuasive.156  As previously discussed when addressing 
standing, the facts in Laumann and the facts in In re NFL Antitrust 
Litigation are nearly identical.  One main difference is that unlike the NFL, 
the MLB and NHL have not incorporated and, though necessarily 
cooperating to produce inter-club games, each club operates as an 
independently owned and managed business and each team owns the initial 
right to control telecasts of its home games.157  However, as noted, the 
Court favors a functional analysis, over formalistic distinctions when 
examining parties’ conduct158  The fact that the NFL has incorporated does 
not mean that the teams act as a single entity and as a result do not fall 
under the holding of American Needle, as discussed above.  In Laumann, 
the court held that plaintiffs have adequately alleged harm to competition 
with respect to the horizontal agreements among individual hockey and 
baseball clubs, as part of the NHL and MLB, to divide the television 
market.159  As a result of the analogous facts between Laumann and In re 
NFL Antitrust Litigation, the Plaintiffs in In re NFL Antitrust Litigation 
have also adequately alleged harm to competition with respect to the 
horizontal agreements, between the NFL Defendants.160 
Lastly, some may argue that since the teams split the revenues from 
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the NFL’s television contracts,161 they are working toward a unified 
economic goal and are acting as a single entity through NFL Enterprises, 
LLC.  Common economic interests, though, do not always equate to a 
league acting as a single entity.  The Seventh Circuit had held NFL teams 
share a vital economic interest in collectively promoting NFL football to 
compete with other forms of entertainment.  Therefore, the teams are the 
one source of economic power which control NFL  promotion.162  The 
Supreme Court rejected the idea that a common economic interest is 
enough to establish that there is a “single entity” when it reversed the 
Seventh Circuit’s grant of defendants’ motion to dismiss.163  While the 
teams split revenues from the television contracts, they still compete for 
ticket sales, for fans, for apparel, and for wins on the football field, all of 
which contribute to their economic success.  NFL teams also received $6 
billion in local revenues in 2016,164 further evincing their economic 
independence.  As a result of the horizontal agreement between the teams, 
television revenues may be the only area where teams do not compete for 
revenues.  This evidence shows that the NFL teams are separate economic 
actors pursuing separate economic interests, such that the agreement 
deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decision making.165  
In combination with the factors discussed above, it is, plausible this 
horizontal agreement violates Section 1 and is anticompetitive. 
 
E. RESTRAINT ON TRADE WITHIN THE RELEVANT MARKET 
 
As held in American Needle, proving injury to competition ordinarily 
requires the claimant to prove the relevant geographic and product markets 
and to demonstrate the effects of the restraint within those markets.166  A 
product market is typically defined by the pool of goods or services that 
qualify as economic substitutes for each other because they enjoy 
reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand.167 
Since the Central District of California neither found that the 
exclusive distributorship here is unlawful, that Defendants restricted 
output, that Defendants artificially inflated prices, or that the horizontal 
agreement between NFL Defendants is anticompetitive, it also held the 
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NFL Defendants did not restrain trade.168  The court agreed the Defendants 
lacked power to artificially inflate prices because viewers could still watch 
free in-market games instead of the unavailable out-of-market games, and 
alternatively that if the free in-market games are not substitutes, then 
Plaintiffs failed to show how selling the broadcast rights to out-of-market 
games would reduce prices.169   
First, by accepting the Defendants’ argument that they lack power to 
artificially inflate prices because viewers can substitute free in-market 
games for out-of-market games, the Central District of California 
contradicts the definition of a relevant market.  A relevant market requires 
goods or services that are economic substitutes, meaning they are 
reasonably interchangeable in terms of use and cross-elasticity of 
demand.170  By the Defendants’ logic, because there are free in-market 
games that serve as substitutes, Defendants cannot inflate prices.  However, 
this reasoning begs the question as to when a plaintiff would be able to 
successfully define a relevant market, including substitutes, without 
simultaneously undermining their own claim that the defendant has power 
to artificially inflate prices.  Every Section 1 claim requires that a relevant 
market be defined, and every relevant market requires substitutes to be 
identified.  By punishing plaintiffs for meeting these requirements as the 
Central District of California has done, courts may discourage plaintiffs 
from bringing valid Section 1 claims. 
Second, the definition of a product market cited by the Central District 
of California states that substitutes should enjoy reasonable 
interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand, and not that they 
must be perfect substitutes.171  Thus, the court’s examples that a consumer 
could watch free in-market games or that a consumer who only wants to 
watch one team’s games takes away DirecTV’s power to artificially inflate 
prices are inapplicable.  Consumers may also desire to watch all games that 
are broadcast, and not only those that are free or only those of their favorite 
team.  And as discussed above, in 2016 16.5 million people tuned in to 
watch regular season NFL games every week.172  Thus, even with the free 
in-market games acting as substitutes, or even if a consumer only wanted to 
watch one team’s games, there is still ample demand for DirecTV to 
capitalize on and artificially inflate prices.  If there was no unlawful 
exclusive distributorship, DirecTV would have to compete with all other 
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providers who would carry Sunday Ticket to attract these consumers. 
The preceding arguments demonstrate that at the very least the 
Plaintiffs had alleged facts sufficient to make it plausible that there is 1) an 
agreement or conspiracy between two or more persons or entities; 2) 
through which the persons or entities intend to harm or restrain 
competition; and, 3) that actually does restrain competition.173 
 
II. THE SECTION II CLAIM–MONOPOLIZATION 
 
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states that “[e]very person who 
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with 
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony.”174  In in re NFL, the Plaintiffs had alleged two 
monopolization claims: one for conspiracy to monopolize, and one for 
actual monopolization.175  To establish a conspiracy to monopolize claim, 
Plaintiffs must plead: 1) the existence of a combination or conspiracy to 
monopolize; 2) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; 3) the specific 
intent to monopolize; and 4) causal antitrust injury.176  To establish a claim 
for actual monopolization, a plaintiff must show a) the possession of 
monopoly power in the relevant market; b) the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power; and c) causal antitrust injury.177  A firm has 
monopoly power if it can profitably raise prices substantially above the 
competitive level.178 
Because the Central District of California dismissed Plaintiffs’ Section 
1 claim, and Plaintiffs conceded that their section 2 claim rose and fell 
along with their Section 1 claim the Court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ Section 
2 claim.179  However, because Plaintiffs’ Section 1 claim is plausible on its 
face, and therefore the Section 2 claim is as well.  Regarding the conspiracy 
to monopolize claim, the unlawful exclusive distributorship itself is a 
combination to monopolize the live presentation of professional football 
broadcasts, not because it is exclusive, but because it is unlawfully 
exclusive; the length of the agreement, lack of substitute brands, restriction 
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of output, artificially inflated prices, and other factors analyzed above show 
an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy and intent to monopolize; and 
the harm to competition and consumers because of the aforementioned 
factors show a causal antitrust injury. 
The same evidence also suffices to show that the Plaintiffs have a 
plausible actual monopolization claim.  Monopoly power is evident 
because the Defendants can charge artificially inflated prices above the 
competitive level, as evinced by the fact that consumers in the US, where 
the unlawful exclusive distributorship exists, pay more for Sunday Ticket 
than consumers in Canada, where Sunday Ticket is provided on a non-
exclusive basis and there is competition for viewers.  Further, the Central 
District of California agreed with the Plaintiffs that there is a relevant 
market for the live presentation of professional football games.  Again, the 
length of the agreement, lack of substitute brands, restriction of output, 
artificially inflated prices, and other factors previously analyzed show 
willful acquisition and maintenance of Defendants’ monopoly power, and 
harm to competition and consumers because of the aforementioned factors 
show a causal antitrust injury.  Hence, Plaintiffs have alleged facts 
sufficient to show that their claims of conspiracy to monopolize and actual 




While this Note may not prove that there are definite Section 1 and 
Section 2 Sherman Antitrust Act violations resulting from the NFL and 
DirecTV’s exclusive distributorship agreement for Sunday Ticket the 
arguments above provide reason to believe that there may be.  In fact, a 
group of the Plaintiffs have filed an appeal to the Central District of 
California’s decision that it is pending before the Ninth Circuit.180  Should 
the Ninth Circuit adopt some of the views advanced above, antitrust 
violations may be proved after all. 
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